PasskeyBridge —

Compliance & Privacy · 2026-11-09

SIM-Swap Liability: Who Absorbs the Loss When Porting Controls Fail

By J. W. Bouckaert

SIM-Swap Liability: Who Absorbs the Loss When Porting Controls Fail

Three parties, three rulebooks

A SIM swap fraud has a short sequence. An attacker persuades or bypasses a mobile carrier and moves the victim's number to a SIM the attacker holds. One-time codes and recovery messages now reach the attacker. The attacker signs in to the victim's bank and moves money out.

Three parties touch that sequence, and in the US each answers to a different rulebook. The carrier answers to the FCC for how it authenticates the SIM change. The bank answers to Regulation E for what the consumer can be made to pay. The consumer's own liability is capped by Regulation E and by the account agreement. This post reads the current text of each.

The carrier: 47 CFR 64.2010(h)

The FCC's SIM change rules sit in 47 CFR 64.2010(h). The current eCFR text says a provider of commercial mobile radio service, "including resellers of wireless service, shall only effectuate SIM change requests in accordance with this section." Paragraph (h)(1) requires "secure methods to authenticate a customer that are reasonably designed to confirm the customer's identity before executing a SIM change request." Those methods "shall not rely on readily available biographical information, account information, recent payment information, or call detail information", and the provider must review them "not less than annually." Paragraph (h)(7) requires employee training on fraudulent SIM change attempts.

Paragraph (h)(9) sets when the carrier is bound. Until 17 November 2026 it read: "Compliance with this paragraph (h) will not be required until this paragraph is removed or contains a compliance date." On 17 November 2026 the FCC published the compliance date in the Federal Register (91 FR 73684, FR Doc. 2026-23400), and (h)(9) now reads: "Compliance with this paragraph (h) is required by December 17, 2026." From that date the rule binds the carrier. The text allocates no consumer loss to the carrier either way.

The bank: Regulation E

Regulation E (12 CFR part 1005) governs electronic fund transfers from consumer accounts. Its definition of an unauthorized electronic fund transfer, in 12 CFR 1005.2(m), is a transfer "initiated by a person other than the consumer without actual authority to initiate the transfer and from which the consumer receives no benefit." On those terms, a transfer an attacker initiates after taking over the account through a moved number fits the definition. Three exclusions apply: a person the consumer gave the access device to, a transfer made "with fraudulent intent by the consumer or any person acting in concert with the consumer", and a transfer made by the institution itself.

12 CFR 1005.6(b) then caps what the consumer can be made to pay:

Consumer noticeConsumer liability cap
Within two business days of learning of the loss or theft of the access deviceThe lesser of $50 or the unauthorized transfers before notice
After two business daysThe lesser of $500 or $50 plus later transfers the institution shows notice would have prevented
Unauthorized transfer on a statement not reported within 60 days of transmittalTransfers after the 60 days that the institution shows notice would have prevented

Paragraph (b)(4) extends the time limits to "a reasonable period" for extenuating circumstances, and (b)(6) applies any lower limit set by state law or by the account agreement.

Everything above the cap stays with the institution. Regulation E does not ask whether the carrier authenticated the SIM change properly. A bank that pays out an unauthorized transfer under Regulation E carries the loss unless a contract moves it elsewhere.

Contracts that move the loss

Regulation E gives the bank no claim against the carrier. Any recovery from the carrier depends on a contract or a lawsuit. The contracts a bank controls are the ones the bank signs with its own vendors: its authentication provider, its fraud platform, and any provider of carrier signals. What those contracts say about a missed swap is worth reading before an incident, because the default under Regulation E is that the bank pays.

Four questions sort a vendor contract:

  • Does the vendor warrant anything about detection, or only about delivering the data its upstream sources returned?
  • What does the vendor return when the carrier gives no answer, and is that state distinguishable from "no swap"?
  • What record does the vendor keep of each lookup, with what timestamp, for how long, and can the bank get it for a dispute?
  • Is the vendor's liability capped at fees paid?

The records that decide a dispute

A dispute over a transfer turns on what the bank knew and when. The useful records are the carrier answer at the moment of the decision, the time of the answer, and the decision the bank took. A carrier lookup that says "swapped 3 hours ago" at the moment of a payee change is the most direct evidence that the bank had the signal and either used it or did not.

That is the part PasskeyBridge supplies. A carrier lookup returns a SIM swap flag and its age where the provider reports one, and scores it: a detected swap adds 0.60, a swap under 24 hours old a further 0.20, one under 72 hours a further 0.10, a ported number 0.15 and an unreachable one 0.10, capped at 1.0. A SIM swap insight the provider did not answer fails the lookup, so a missing answer is never recorded as "no swap". The phone number is held in memory for the single vendor call; what is stored, audited and forwarded is a keyed digest, HMAC-SHA-256 under a server-held pepper. Provider coverage and request rules are in the carrier provider setup guide. For why one provider's answer differs from another's for the same event, see carrier signal variance, and for the account recovery side, carrier state at the account recovery front door.

PasskeyBridge is a signal provider. It does not hold customer funds, and it does not change who carries a loss under Regulation E. The decision, and the liability for it, stays with the bank.

Summary table

PartyRuleWhat it requiresLoss it carries by default
Carrier47 CFR 64.2010(h)Secure authentication before a SIM change; training; annual reviewNone allocated by the rule; compliance required by 17 December 2026
Bank12 CFR 1005.6Liability caps for unauthorized transfersEverything above the consumer's cap
Consumer12 CFR 1005.6(b)Timely notice$50, $500, or post-60-day transfers, lower if state law or the agreement says so

Frequently Asked Questions

Who pays for SIM swap fraud under Regulation E?

For an unauthorized electronic fund transfer from a consumer account, 12 CFR 1005.6 caps the consumer's liability at $50 with notice within two business days, $500 after that, and later transfers if a statement goes unreported for 60 days. The institution carries the rest unless a contract moves it.

Are US carriers required to authenticate customers before a SIM change?

Yes, from 17 December 2026. 47 CFR 64.2010(h)(1) requires secure authentication methods before a SIM change. The FCC published the compliance date in the Federal Register on 17 November 2026 (FR Doc. 2026-23400), and paragraph (h)(9) now states that compliance is required by December 17, 2026.

Does a SIM swap make a transfer unauthorized under Regulation E?

12 CFR 1005.2(m) defines an unauthorized transfer as one initiated by a person other than the consumer without actual authority and from which the consumer receives no benefit. Transfers by a person the consumer gave the access device to, or made with the consumer's fraudulent intent, are excluded.

Does PasskeyBridge take on fraud liability?

No. PasskeyBridge supplies carrier and authenticator signals and records of each lookup. It does not hold funds, and the decision and the liability under Regulation E stay with the bank.

Start free · Test the API