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PasskeyBridge vs Prove

Prove centers on the phone number. PasskeyBridge checks carrier state, passkeys, and verifiable credentials through the session.

Prove built a category around phone-centric identity assurance. PasskeyBridge treats the phone as one input, alongside passkeys, verifiable credentials, and cross-app revocation. Low-entropy identifiers are stored as keyed HMAC-SHA-256 digests.

Where the overlap is real

Prove and PasskeyBridge agree on a foundational thesis: the mobile carrier network is one of the most under-used trust signals in modern identity, and SIM-swap and port-out attacks are routinely undetected by IdPs and KYC tools alone. Both platforms ingest carrier-derived data, both surface tenure and SIM-change events, and both can be wired into step-up flows.

If the job is to bind a phone number to an account and detect SIM swaps at sign-in, either platform can do that job. The architectures diverge once the check also has to cover passkeys, verifiable credentials, and revocation after sign-in.

Where the architectures diverge

Prove is, by design, phone-first. The product surface, the integrations, and the commercial model orbit around the mobile number as the trust anchor. That is a coherent strategy, and for many use cases it is the correct one.

PasskeyBridge is signal-agnostic. Carrier data is one of seven first-class signal classes—alongside FIDO2 passkeys with DPoP binding, W3C verifiable credentials, CAEP/SSF cross-app session events, SCIM lifecycle deltas, ISPM posture telemetry from your IdP, and physics-layer spatial-binding attestations. The policy engine evaluates all seven signal classes together.

  • Seven signal classes in one cascade engine.
  • Hybrid post-quantum signatures (classical plus ML-DSA-65) on credentials and passkey session attestations.
  • Zero-PII storage model: identifiers hashed with keyed HMAC-SHA-256 under a server-held pepper, so the digests cannot be reversed by enumeration.
  • Edge-first verification, with latency published live at /developers/playground.
  • CAEP/SSF receiver runs the revocation cascade in-process on the same request.

Post-quantum signatures on identity assertions

Credentials and passkey session attestations are dual-signed: classical ES256, or ES384 on the add-on, plus a detached ML-DSA-65 signature (NIST FIPS 204; ML-DSA-87 on the add-on). The detached ML-DSA signature covers the JWS signing input followed by `:qnonce:` and a quantum-seeded nonce that travels with the signature. Chain checkpoints use a separate canonical form.

Prove does not, to our knowledge, ship hybrid PQC signatures on its identity assertions today. That may change, and we'll update this page when it does. But it changes the procurement conversation today: if your security architecture team has a post-2030 horizon, the answer matters.

Verifiable credentials and BYOK

PasskeyBridge issues and verifies W3C Verifiable Credentials 2.0, including SD-JWT-VC, with OpenID4VP support and a Bring-Your-Own-Key model so credentials remain portable and tenant-controlled. Our PBWallet SDK lets relying parties verify presentations without a runtime dependency on us.

Prove operates a closed identity graph. That has commercial advantages—single source of truth, single integration—and architectural disadvantages: it is harder to interoperate with EUDI Wallet, eIDAS 2.0 trust frameworks, or downstream agent-to-agent (A2A) identity protocols that assume open, standards-based credentials.

Latency, again

Low decision latency is a non-negotiable for in-the-hot-path identity controls, and it is the reason we run an edge-first 'Gatehouse' architecture. Phone-centric verification flows that round-trip to a central registry and back are perfectly fine for sign-in, but break the moment you try to apply them to every authenticated request, every agent action, or every credential presentation.

If your roadmap includes agent-mediated identity, A2A trust establishment, or per-request policy decisions, the latency budget is a product requirement.

How to think about the choice

If you need a phone-centric identity authority with mature US carrier integrations and a long track record in financial-services onboarding, Prove is a credible choice and the comparison is fair.

If you need a continuous identity threat response layer that treats the phone as one signal among several, signs credentials with hybrid post-quantum signatures, and stores low-entropy identifiers as keyed HMAC-SHA-256 digests, PasskeyBridge is the architectural fit. Prove can stay in place for phone-centric onboarding.

Capability matrix

Side-by-side: PasskeyBridge vs Prove. Evaluated against publicly documented product capabilities.

Capability
PasskeyBridge
Prove
Primary use case
Continuous ITRaaS across 7 signal classes
Phone-centric identity assurance
Carrier-signal ingestion
GSMA Open Gateway + multi-provider
Direct US carrier integrations
SIM swap / port-out detection
Hardware-bound passkeys (FIDO2)
WebAuthn + DPoP. Hardware-bound is an opt-in policy on the relying party.
Phone-bound
Verifiable credentials (W3C VC 2.0)
SD-JWT-VC, OpenID4VP, BYOK
EUDI Wallet / eIDAS 2.0 readiness
Zero-PII binding layer
Hybrid post-quantum signaturesClassical + ML-DSA-65 on every attestation
Zero-PII storage model
Keyed HMAC-SHA-256 (server-held pepper)
Operates an identity graph with PII
Edge p50 verification latency
Live probe published
Origin round-trip; phone-flow dependent
CAEP / SSF receiver
In-process cascade dispatch
Agent-to-agent (A2A) trust
A2A protocol + AI ops segmentation
Okta integration
Hardened hook, max 50 events
Public OpenAPI spec
v2.0.0, x-pb-api-key
Patent posture
20 US patent applications filed (7 non-provisional, 13 provisional)
Phone-identity portfolio

Evaluation based on publicly documented Prove product capabilities as of Q2 2026. Prove is a registered trademark of Prove Identity, Inc.; this comparison is independent and not endorsed by Prove.

Frequently asked

Does PasskeyBridge replace Prove?
For the narrow phone-binding use case, yes—our carrier-signal pipeline covers SIM swap, port-out, tenure, and device-change detection. For the broader identity-threat surface, Prove was never trying to solve the same problem.
Why is hybrid PQC important now?
Identity attestations are long-lived evidence. A signature that is unverifiable in 2030 is worthless in a 2030 audit, regardless of what was true in 2026. Hybrid signing (classical + ML-DSA-65) lets the same artefact remain valid through the transition.
Can we ingest signals from Prove and treat them as inputs?
Yes. Anything you can express as a hashed identity signal can be normalised through shield-ingest and routed into the cascade engine. You can keep your existing systems in place.
What does 'zero-PII' actually mean?
We never persist primary identifiers in plaintext. Phone numbers, email and IP addresses, and subject identifiers are hashed at the edge with keyed HMAC-SHA-256 under a server-held pepper. Matching across signals stays possible because the digest is deterministic; reading them back does not, because the pepper never leaves our servers.
Where do I see latency numbers I can trust?
Our /developers/playground page runs real /health probes against production. You can fire single requests or 10x bursts and see the p50, p95, and p99 in your own browser. Every latency number we publish can be reproduced on that page.

See it on your own traffic

Spin up a tenant in under two minutes. Send your first signal, inspect the verifier response, and decide.